Abstract: This paper examines the nature, process, and implication of recent community governance
n response to the various power vacuums created by rapid social and economic reforms, the Chinese government has become very active in building new institutions at the grassroots of society. One of the most noteworthy of these efforts is the "urban community building project," which was originally implemented as a pilot project by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the late 1980s. It was envisioned to meet the growing demand of community-oriented social service no longer covered by the danwei (work unit) system. This policy package soon expanded nationwide and led to a variety of community governance innovations. In Shanghai, for example, a new administrative framework called "two levels of governments, three levels of administration" was developed in 1996 to organize community-based public service delivery and maintain social stability (Xu, 2000; Shi & Pan 1998 ). More recently, residents' committee elections and "deliberative assembly" have been promoted to engage local residents in the neighborhood political process (Liu, 2006) . These state-led community governance reforms have triggered growing scholarly interest in the study of neighborhood politics in China (Lin & Ma, 2000; Lin, 2002; Yang, 2002; Pan, 2002; Zhu, 2002; Read, 1999 Read, , 2003a Read, , 2003b Benewick et al., 2004; Derleth & Koldyk, 2004; Liu, 2006) . Conventional wisdom would argue that such state-led reforms aim to bind local residents to state patronage and consolidate state power in grassroots society (Schurmann, 1968; Vogel, 1971; Whyte & Parish, 1984; Walder 1986; Henderson & Cohen, 1984; Lieberthal, 1989; Lewis, 1971; Sidel, 1974) . However, recent studies have recognized that these reforms afford specific institutional resources which may be positive to some forms of civic participation and neighborhood activism. State-led institution building in the neighborhood context also provides opportunities for the development of civil associations and community movements, which are in turn conductive to the enlargement of horizontal networks, trust relationships, and norms of general reciprocity (Liu, 2005a; Zhu, 2002; Yang, 2002) . This paper examines the nature, process and implication of recent community governance reforms in Shanghai with a focus on the potential role of these institutional innovations in generating social solidarity and autonomy as heralded by social capital and civil society theories. At its simplest, solidarity refers to the bonds between all individuals within a society and reflects the degree of social integration. Social solidarity is closely associated with the concept of social capital, which is widely defined as network of civic engagement, norms of reciprocity, and attitudes of trust (Putnam, 1993) .
1 Assuming the importance of social solidarity, scholars have argued that formal and informal associations are the creators of social capital and networks because of their socialization effects on democratic and cooperative value and norms. Putnam's seminal work in Italy contended that dynamic "civic communities" are associated with the predominance of horizontal solidarities and that in "uncivic" regions participation is stunted by the persistence of vertical dependences. Such a stance was also exemplified by Fukuyama (1995) , who believed cultural values are the key to understanding the evolution of social solidarity: One needs the right kind of society-wide normative values to build and sustain social relations that can produce I the "public goods" with which civil society is associated (e.g., encouraging cooperation, bounded conflict, respect for others, accountability and the rule of law, etc).
Recent studies on civic engagement and civil society have begun to depart from this perspective and emphasize the institutional factors in shaping social solidarity. They argue that the degree of solidarity exhibited by a community depends on the formal political and legal environment in which they are embedded (Berman, 1997; Levi, 1998; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003; Fox, 1996; Tarrow, 1996) . Social solidarity is created, channeled and influenced by government policies and political institutions. Institutions may exert an independent effect on trustworthiness, and thus on how social actors trust or distrust each other. Furthermore, the evolution of institutions may be expected to have an impact on trustworthiness, and thus on trust, and thus on community solidarities.
By examining the impact of community governance innovations on neighborhood-level social solidarity in Shanghai, this study argues for a pattern of "empowered autonomy" in which top-down state intervention enables local residents to reconfigure their relationship with governmental extensions on better terms. Empowered autonomy indicates a distinctive role of state intervention in creating institutional space for local solidarity and framing local residents' social networking behavior in indigenous agendas.
In the first section of this paper, I examine how rapid social and economic changes combined to shape the initial agenda of community building, which emphasized localized bureaucratic integration. Then I demonstrate why and how empowerment strategies reconfigure this pattern of administrative community in the second stage of community governance reforms. The policy shift from integration to empowerment is ultimately caused by the lack of residents' participation in community engineering, which in turn undermines the efficiency of political control. In the third section, I use a case study to show how local residents accumulate a form of interpersonal social network through involvement within these empowerment settings. I found that while community empowerment in Shanghai involves enormous political control, it nevertheless provides vibrant institutional spaces and resources for local residents to broaden their horizontal-level interactions. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications and limitations of these findings.
Governing the Grassroots: From Integration to Empowerment
The manner in which local communities are organized and governed is crucial to China's sociopolitical control system. In Mao's China, an urban governing arrangement was established with two basic principles: the first is functional in the form of the danwei (work unit) system and based on employment; the second is geographical and based on the place of residence (Salaff, 1967 (Salaff, , 1971 . The danweis were workplace units (typically state-owned enterprises) that guaranteed employees secure jobs, affordable housing, medical care, pensions, and subsidies for everything from food to transportation. The danwei also had a political role as it closely monitored its employee's public and personal activities, wielding an assortment of rewards and sanctions to encourage politically acceptable behavior. Paralleling the danwei system, the urban government system was divided into municipalities and districts and these in turn sub-divided into street offices, residents' committees. At the bottom of this framework, the residents' committee was organized with an appointed leadership and affiliated activists' networks, and functioned as a gatekeeper for the overarching political system. The predominantly bureaucratic nature of this governing arrangement forms the structural basis of social control and gives urban social life a distinctive quality: it is characterized by higher levels of stability than in comparable cities in the West (Whyte & Parish, 1984, pp. 236-237) . However, with the crucial role of the danwei system in organizing urban society, both street office and residents' committees are comparatively marginal in sociopolitical control. Under this governing framework, local residents were weakly attached to their neighborhoods because of the higher importance of the danwei system in their work experience and social interaction.
Community-based Administrative Integration
During the course of rapid urban changes in China, two structural factors have emerged to undermine the efficiency of existing governing arrangements: danwei reform or "de-danweilisation" and housing commercialization reforms. These two forces have combined to raise a particular demand for community-based administrative integration. First, "de-danweilization" involves the processes and consequences of market-oriented danwei reforms, characterized by considerable weakening of organized political control over the workforce in a city (You, 1998, pp. 23-28) .
3 This dimension of reform shifts a tremendous number of social functions and responsibility for occupational welfare from danweis to the local community (Lee, 2000) , thereby adding to the administrative burdens of local governments (Chan, 1993; Wong, 1998, pp. 72-74) . The second structural context lies in housing privatization reforms. While state-distributed housing in the pre-reform era was inherent to organized urban control, housing commercialization in the postreform age had led to the privatization of neighborhood space, thus further expanding the gap between the state and residents. De-danweilization and housing privatization have coupled to bring many neighborhood power vacuums that become sources of political alienation from the Party-state. In response to this, the central government called upon the Ministry of Civil Affairs to revitalize street offices and residents' committees to take over some previous social welfare responsibilities of danweis and to strengthen community control (Derleth & Koldyk, 2004) . This opened a set of experimental community governance initiatives under the general rubric of "urban community building." In Shanghai, the earlier mode of community governance was designed in the framework of "two layers of government, three layers of administration" in 1996. In policy discourse, "two layers of government" refers to the governments at the municipal and district levels that have independent financial and law enforcement powers. "Three layers of administration" explains the stratification of actual governing power in the city, with a special focus on the layer of the street office (Shi & Pan, 1998) The rationale behind this governing framework innovation was obviously to integrate street office and residents' committee into a territorially-based administrative network. According to the "Policy Paper on Strengthening Street Office, Residents Committee and Community Management in Shanghai" formulated by the municipal government, the street office was to convert from a "subordinated agency" of the district government to a community-rooted governing agency with regulatory functions. It stipulated that the administration area of each street office should be reconfigured and standardized to cover five square kilometers (or about 100,000 residents). Second, the standard quota of every street office's "approved positions of public servants" was increased from approximately 55 to 60.
5 Third, to change its previous marginal status in the urban government, the street office was to receive more autonomous financial resources via a new street-level fiscal system. The overarching district government would be responsible for funding the street office through fiscal transferring. These arrangements were further incorporated into the "Code of Street Office in Shanghai" promulgated by the People's Congress of Shanghai in 1997. As codified, the street office would take responsibility for a wide range of community administrative tasks: directing and assisting the residents committee in its organizationand institution-building, organizing community service, developing a street-level economy, and so on. In actuality, the structures of the street office were reconfigured according to these policy documents. For example, in the Wuliqiao sub-district of the Luwan district, various street agencies are networked on the street office level. These agencies include the legal assistance office, the business and commercial administration office, the streetscape maintenance team, and the real estate administration office. The street office is now responsible for the nomination and evaluation of officials in public security, housing management, business, and retail administration and directly appoints the head of the sanitation and hygiene office. To further strengthen its street-level administration, the Luwan district government delegated a number of regulatory powers to the street office, including approval of the residential plan, the housing development plan, the housing projects' completion, site occupation licensing, outdoor advertisement management, the privately operated restaurant and catering service licensing, and illegal construction penalties (Wu, 2002 ; see also Zhu, 1999; Guo, 2003) .
"Community" in this policy context is neither a natural human ecology with primary and communal ties nor a cultural social entity; it essentially becomes an administrative unit imposed by the street office and residents' committee nested in the overarching urban government system. Administrative community as such is expected to be effective in top-down policy implementation and public service delivery. Ironically, the scarcity of institutional channels and incentives for ordinary residents to participate in the communitywide decision-making process eventually undermines the effectiveness of such bureaucratic institutions. This has led to the second wave of community governance innovation to democratize residents' committees and empower local residents.
Community-based Democratic Empowerment
To construct a democratic governing infrastructure in urban neighborhoods, two basic approaches have been explored to empower the residents' committee and local residents: residents committee election and the design of deliberative institutions. Following its rural counterparts, the experiment of residents committee election was inaugurated in Shanghai in 1999. At its initial stage, a residents' committee election is usually organized in an indirect mode, which evolves in several stages. First, a registration list is produced to ensure that only eligible residents are permitted to vote. Second, residents select their block-based representatives, from whom a community level representative assembly is organized. The assembly forms an electoral base for the new residents' committee. Third, a pool of candidates is nominated or elected through sub-group meetings. The candidates are subject to political screening by the Party's neighborhood branch and street officials. The list of formal candidates is posted a few days before the election and they are encouraged to deliver campaign speeches at the representative assembly. Finally, the representative assembly organizes a special election meeting to cast ballots for members of the committee. The ballots are counted by an independent work team, which will also publicize the election outcome. Although these procedures are far from a perfect system of direct democracy, they nonetheless give residents a voice in their local governance that they never had before. Indeed, even this very limited franchise represents a notable leap forward from the past when members of residents committee were chosen exclusively by the government (Dugan, 2002) .
The recent development of community democracy in Shanghai demonstrates two progressive features. First, the election is more procedurally democratic. This is indicated by several key procedures of the election: direct nomination of candidates by residents, increased competitiveness in the election of residents' committee members, anonymous voting, and open count of votes. Second, the scope of the election is greatly expanded. The first community elections in 1999 were conducted experimentally in only two street offices. The second round in 2003 targeted nearly 3,400 residents' committees across the city with 30% organized by direct election (Liu, 2005b) . In 2006, more than half of the residents' committees in the city were organized by direct election (Jing & Liu, 2007) .
Residents' committee elections are not the whole story of community democracy building. A complementary approach advocated by the government is to create deliberative institutions and foster a form of deliberative politics in the community. In many neighborhoods, the deliberative institution takes the shape of the "deliberative assembly" (yishi hui). For example, all the neighborhoods in the Jing'ansi street office have been installed with deliberative assembly since 1996. The assembly has four principal functions: raising suggestions for local public affairs, mobilizing residents and homeowner associations to engage in community problem solving, exploring residents' attitudes towards the residents' committee's work, and cooperating with the Party's neighborhood branch. The organization of deliberative assembly is based on volunteerism. In the Huashan neighborhood under the Jing'ansi street office, the assembly consists of 13 members, 10 of whom have college or university educations and high social reputations in the local community (Liu, 2003, p. 206) . The assembly actually formed a government-led community elite network and has considerably shaped the relationship between government and residents as well as the structure of neighborhood governance.
Another typical deliberative institution is the "three-meeting institution" (sanhui zhidu), namely meetings for coordination, hearing, and evaluation. The coordination meeting (xietiao hui) is an occasional mechanism officiated by the residents' committee to address trivial social conflicts within the neighborhood. Through this mechanism, the conflicting parties are invited to negotiate a solution facilitated by the "mediation committee" comprised of the residents' committee and the secretary of Chinese Communist Party's neighborhood branch. Depending on the nature and scale of the conflicts, some functional departments in the street office may sit in on the coordination meeting. Public hearings (tingzheng hui) help residents articulate their interests and raise their voices on public policies that impact their neighborhood life. In practice, residents' committees are invigorated by organizing such meetings and by relaying residents' comments and complaints to the overarching government. The evaluation meeting (pingyi hui) is also organized by the residents committee to access the performance and service quality of the residents' committee and street offices (Civil Affair Bureau of Luwan District Government, 2001).
Both residents' committee elections and deliberative institutions have had notably empowering effects on the community. For example, in the Nanjing East street office in the Huangpu district, three-meeting institutions have been regularly applied to mediate social conflicts induced by neighborhood regeneration projects. In 2006, before the street office determined to upgrade the buildings of the Weihai Road No. 20 neighborhoods, several rounds of public hearings were organized by the residents' committee to collect different perspectives and build consensus. Coordination meetings were also held during the neighborhood regeneration implementation process. Finally, residents committees also invited project-impacted residents into the evaluation meeting to assess the quality of this regeneration effort (East Nanjing Road Street Office, 2007). With more democratic institutions, residents' committees find that they become increasingly effective at local problem solving and residents' behavior regulation.
Empowered Autonomy: A Prima Facie Study
What are the implications of these governance innovations for social solidarity? As mentioned earlier, the institution theory of social capital suggests that we can learn about the conditions under which trust and social capital will emerge and be maintained in a society by studying the ways in which its social institutions evolve. The following prima facie case study illustrates the implications of community governance innovation in Shanghai, and the institutional logic of community solidarity in Chinese urban society.
The Bamboo Garden Village is a gated community in Shanghai's Central Pudong New District.
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In 1999, it had 1,319 households (over 3,500 residents), in 72 housing blocks covering 0.12 square kilometers. Bamboo Garden was selected in 1999 as one of the first round experimental cases of residents' committee election. Although this study explores the election in the indirect mode, its historical accomplishment makes Bamboo Garden an exemplary site to research the practice of community democracy and its empowering effects on community solidarity.
The 1999 residents' committee election in Bamboo Garden was implemented in several planned stages (see Figure 2 ). To frame a consensus, the existing residents' committee conducted a survey on the options of the election mode. Based on a majority of the responses, the committee decided to adopt the housing blocks based on "indirect election"-that is, the new residents committee members would be elected by block-based resident representatives rather than by household or individual constituents. Some key stages would then follow the election: organizing the representative assembly, establishing the executive committee, electing and selecting candidates, and casting ballots.
Figure 2. The Format of the 1999 Residents' Committee Election in Bamboo Garden

Source: Adapted from the Bamboo Garden Residents' Committee Office (1999a).
In post-election Bamboo Garden, the community's power structure was significantly reconfigured (see Figure 3) . The resident representative assembly became whole governing system's power source. It was organized with all the eligible local residents over 18 years-old, or representatives recommended by resident sub-groups. The assembly is supposed to convene at least twice a year. It has three basic functions: making decisions over issues that are related to the residents' collective interests, checking the annual working report of residents' committee, and electing and organizing residents' committee members. The supervision committee is more or less independent under the new system. Its panel is composed of seven residents recommended by the elected residents' committee members and resident representatives, and works independently of the residents' committee. The supervision committee has the authority to check the routine work of the residents' committee. Source: Bamboo Garden Residents ' Committee Office (1999b) .
Five sub-committees were set up under the elected residents' committee to strengthen the capacity for community problem solving. Each sub-committee is composed of cross-sector actors, including residents' committee members, social workers, resident representatives, and governmental officials. For example, the "housing property management" subcommittee includes the manager of the housing management company and a representative from street office who acts as its coordinator. As such, subcommittees are often more resourceful in their concerned community governance efforts. 7 Bamboo Garden's innovative governing arrangement has significantly impacted the relationship between the government and residents in three aspects. First, with its greater representation, the residents' committee improved its responsiveness as well as its administrative capacity. For example, on August 16, 2000, a monthly coordination meeting was held by the housing property management subcommittee. Both the manager of the housing management company and street office delegates attended. Residents' committee members took this opportunity to address 10 community problems, including "insufficient lighting in stair areas," "lack of greenbelt in our community," and "lack of community security." Through constructive negotiations, the residents' committee received positive responses from both the housing management company and the street office officials. At the same meeting, a schedule was formulated to solve these problems and the residents' committee was invited to supervise the work of housing management afterwards. Mr. Wu, a representative from the housing management company, praised the residents' committee's role in coordinating housing service management: Some homeowners are just too critical about our management quality and often we get unfair complaints. We trust the residents' committee because it has a lot of connections with the residents. Most important of all, they are increasingly trusted by neighborhood residents. Thus, it is better to be organized by the residents' committee to sit down and find a solution to housing managing problems (Bamboo Garden interview, August 2003).
Second, the new governing arrangement has enabled residents to articulate their interests in an autonomous manner. Apart from attending the quarterly residents' representative meeting, residents can attend the monthly sub-committee meetings. To resident representatives and the elected residents' committee members, the sub-committee monthly meetings provide one of the most effective channels for deliberating and negotiating the community's public affairs. For example, in March 2001, 20 residents attended a sub-committee meeting to propose the construction of an outdoor gym. Residents' committee members responded to this request with more than three sessions of consultations in the resident group meeting. After consulting on where and how to establish such a public sports area in the neighborhood, they submitted a report to the street office for financial support. Within two months, this project was completed and the gym was opened for public use with praise from many residents.
Residents' comprehensive engagement in the community's public affairs also provides new opportunities for them to develop community initiatives and a sense of trust in the residents' committee. This study found that residents who participated in the residents committee system spoke up more actively at the residents' committee's group meetings. Table 1 shows the types and frequencies of residents' engaging behavior in the Bamboo Garden community in 2002. The information collected is by no means complete, but it shows that residents were more likely to engage in activities that the residents' committee organized. Furthermore, it indicates that, among the listed activities, people were willing to participate in those related to their neighborhood interests, such as crime prevention and neighbor conflict mediation. For example, 43.3% and 46.1% of respondents engaged "often" or "sometimes" in the respective activities of community patrols and intermediating neighbors' interests. 
Source: Adopted from the results of a survey conducted by the Bamboo Garden Residents' Committee on community participation (n=55). Bamboo Garden Residents Committee Office (2002).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, subgroups in which residents horizontally interact have been stimulated by the new governing framework. In pre-election Bamboo Garden, there were some sporadic "mass groups" affiliated with the residents committee. They were limited in constituents' mobilization and organized very few cultural and community entertainment events. However, the number of these groups grew considerably after the election, and they became all the more energetic and self-regulating. Table 2 contains information about some major sub-groups in the neighborhood by 2003. After the election, residents were encouraged to engage with each other frequently based on common interests. The growing percentage of local residents engaged with each other through these informal groups further signifies the growing sense of community solidarity and autonomy. It is noteworthy that the mechanisms through which residents developed face-to-face interaction in the sub-groups were deliberately promoted by the residents' committee. Mrs. Zhu, an elected deputy director of the residents committee claimed, Promoting residents' membership in these groups is a basic means to build the residents' committee's familiarity with the local people. And this is important for mutual trust in the community. By reaching these residents through such everyday forms of contact, elected committee members can bring the committee closer to the people, learn what residents think, and respond in more casual and effective ways (Bamboo Garden interview, January 2004).
In fact, many residents responded to the committee's sub-group promotions with cooperative attitudes and initiative. Many residents appreciated Mrs. Zhu's entrepreneurial spirit because she could always facilitate the organization of these activities in their interests. Mrs. Yan, the leader of the team of Mulanquan, added, We learn from each other and practice Mulanquan regularly. At the very beginning we had a very small number of participants, and it was not easy for us to find a proper venue to play our game. The elected residents' committee members are very helpful. They have more organizational capacity and can help recruit more talent and committed members, and help to find a good place. They even invite some professional instructors to give training courses for us and help prepare our team for a public show (Bamboo Garden interview, July 2003).
Mrs. Zhu and Mrs. Yan's testimonies demonstrate the importance of a state-led institution in the creation of vibrant neighborhood solidarity. While most leisure time and interpersonal interaction among residents were shaped by the danwei system before the systematic reforms of the 1990s (Wang, 1993) , the state's revitalization of the residents' committee, through granting it more responsibility, if not accountability, has created an special institutional space through which societal engagement can be reproduced and sustained.
Overall, neighborhood activism in Bamboo Garden-from citizens' willingness to contact the residents committee and create initiatives to solve neighborhood problems, to the formation of various sub-groups to deliberate different ways of addressing these problems-has had very important implications. These examples demonstrate that there is a gradual and meaningful increase of community solidarity due to democratic empowerment via the residents' committee. The democratization of the residents' committee provides a path for civic development in China by creating the necessary means for residents to engage with each other.
Concluding Remarks
It is crucial in a rapidly transitioning society for the overarching government to build new institutions into emerging social spaces, such as gated communities. In this paper I have briefly described the trajectory of community governance reforms in grassroots Shanghai, which have shifted from the pattern of administrative integration to democratic empowerment. While these innovations demonstrate an attempt to bolster the state's organizational mechanism within residential neighborhoods, they also shape community solidarity by expanding various institutional spaces for social engagement.
Broadly defined, social solidarity and social capital indicate the potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and to engage in civic endeavors. Recognizing its normative significance, scholars in the field of civic engagement have been curious about the strange disappearance of strong civic life in liberal democracies (Putnam, 1993) . Along with the communitarians, these scholars have warned that the decline in communal bonds and the erosion of mutual obligations had created a domestic crisis; therefore, community organizations should be revitalized, as they are the backbone of a strong civil society. As Etzinoni argued, "participating in the governance of one of the many institutions of the community…enables people to participate openly and directly in making the decisions that govern their lives" (1993, pp. 141-2) .
In this theoretical milieu, we should consider the stories from Bamboo Garden in Shanghai very instructive about the institutional mechanisms through which social solidarity and civic life are cultivated. Indeed, in less democratic settings, state initiatives are especially important precisely because they may open the possibility of and create the necessary incentives and resources for local residents to learn and practice civic interactions. State-led democratic governance thus exerts an empowering effect on civic engagement and paves the way for the development of autonomous, selfgoverning communities. This version of the statesociety relationship can be explained as "empowered autonomy," which echoes what Fung and Wright (2000) found-that empowered state settings around such issues as community policing and school reform can effectively draw many participants who otherwise would have little community involvement, and that the participants in state-sponsored assemblies create open-ended and public-minded discussions even in poor socioeconomic settings (see also Baiocchi, 2003) .
Indeed, there exist substantial empirical variations of such empowering effects, and the notion of "empowered autonomy" can by no means be taken for granted. There are many state initiatives that have undermined social solidarity. As James Coleman (1990) suggested, government involvement in the locality more often than not leads to the atrophying of informal networks, therefore diminishing social solidarity and trust. Which type of state intervention best empowers social actors and under what conditions remains to be explored. Drawing a preliminary case study from Shanghai, however, we can theorize a potentially positive cycle of interaction between democratic governing institutions and networks of engagement among ordinary citizens in a transitional context. This synergistic scheme may undoubtedly have far-reaching policy implications and deserves further sophisticated study.
Notes
1 Emile Durkheim (1933) dichotomized two classical ideal types of solidarity. Mechanical solidarity refers to social cohesion based upon the likeness and similarities among individuals in a society, and is largely dependent on common rituals and routines. Organic solidarity, which is more likely to exist in modern industrial societies, refers to social cohesion based upon the dependence of individuals. These two types of solidarity correspond respectively to bonding social capital and bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000) . In reality, these two forms of solidarity and social capital may coexist in neighborhood society and combine to shape the pattern of community autonomy. 2 Equally important in the making of Chinese urban order is the household registration (hukou) system, which was an integral part of the broader danwei system. The household registration system was established in cities in 1951 and extended to rural areas in 1955. It was formalized as a permanent system in 1958. For the origins and development of this system in urban control, see Cheng and Selden (1994) . 3 De-danweilization parallels de-collectivization in rural society since the 1980s. De-collectivization enormously weakened the state's hold over village leaders and villagers' dependence on those leaders, and, as a result, the power of the state to control peasants (Unger, 1989) . 4 In pre-reform urban China, housing was guaranteed and managed by the state authority through the bureau of housing and the danwei system. This fostered "incorporated residential communities" based on relationships between workers who lived together in enclosed and restricted compounds (Lu & Perry, 1997, p. 11) . Corresponding to housing privatization, homeowner associations have emerged and added to the complexity of community governance. For the development and implications of homeowner associations, see Read (2003b) , Tang (2004) and Davis (2004) . 5 Street office and residents' committee staff was generally labeled "grassroots cadre," which actually includes three types of positions: the "administrative position" constituted by a "public servant"; the "party management position" partly composed by a "public servant"; and the "service unit position." Before reform, residents' committee staff were appointed by the street office and fell into the service unit position. Elected residents' committee members, however, are no longer in this position system. 6 The name of the neighborhood and all the residents interviewed are pseudonyms. 7 The Bamboo Garden residents' committee election in 1999 also turned out to be an opportunity for the ruling Party to invigorate its social support and strengthen its influence in the community. In fact, the voting turnout in Bamboo Garden reveals that 71.4% of the newly elected residents' committee members were also Party members (Lin & Ma, 2001 ). They were organized into the Party's neighborhood branch and played an important role in setting agendas in residents' committee meetings and sub-committee gatherings. The fact that many Party members concurrently hold leading positions in urban communities indicates that the Party's dominance over the grassroots has strengthened rather than weakened (Benewick et al., 2004) .
